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waiver, the lower courts have, in fact, consistently avoided the effects of
the Wade-Gilbert rules by the use of these avoidance mechanisms. These
courts have proved through their decisions that the possibilities for avoidance have tended to render the Wade-Gilbert rules totally ineffective.
Since the decision in Wade shows a belief on the part of the Supreme
Court for the necessity of maintaining the right to counsel at any critical
stage, the only way to insure that right will be to eliminate these mechanisms of avoidance. At this point in the application of the Wade-Gilbert
rules it is significant to recall the words of the Supreme Court in Escobedo:
There is necessarily a direct relationship between the importance of a stage to the
police in their quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused

in his need for legal advice. Our Constitution, unlike some others, strikes the
82
balance in favor of the right of the accused to be advised by his lawyer.

TORTS-NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONDOWNFALL OF PRIVITY
On March 30, 1966, appellant purchased a pair of shoes at a retail store.
While wearing the shoes on the day of purchase she stepped on to the
vinyl floor of her kitchen and sustained severe injuries after slipping and
falling. Appellant subsequently brought suit against the retailer, the importer, and respondent Hearst Corporation; the complaint averred conspiracy, warranty, and negligent misrepresentation. Appellant alleged that
respondent Hearst publishes Good Housekeeping magazine, in which
products are advertised as conforming to the "Good Housekeeping's Consumer's Guaranty Seal." 1 Regarding the seal, Good Housekeeping
stated: "[W]e satisfy ourselves that products advertised in Good Housekeeping are good ones and that the advertising claims made for them in our
magazine are truthful."'2 The Seal itself promised: "If the product or
performance is defective, Good Housekeeping guarantees replacement or
refund to consumer."'3 Appellant further alleged that the shoes she purchased had received the aforementioned Good Housekeeping endorsement, that the Good Housekeeping Seal was affixed both to the shoes and
to the shoes' container with respondent Hearst's consent, and that she relied upon respondent's representation and seal in purchasing the shoes.
The trial court sustained a general demurrer by respondent and entered
its judgment of dismissal. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal as
to the causes of action dealing with conspiracy and warranty, and re82.

Escobedo v. Illinois, supra note 10, at 488.

1. Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 519, 521 (1969).
2. Id. at 521.
3. Id.
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versed as to the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. 4 The
court held that appellant had, for purposes of pleading, asserted facts
sufficient to state a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation by the
publisher. Hanberry v. Hearst Corporation, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969).
This decision is significant because it is a final step, the culmination of
a series of cases which have, for all practical purposes, eliminated privity
of contract as a requirement in California to recover in a tort action against
one who endorses a product manufactured by another. The purpose of
this casenote is twofold: 1. to discuss the origin of the requirement of
privity and, using relevant case law, to show the step-by-step process by
which it was eliminated; and 2. to evaluate the case and describe the extension of previous case law that it represents.
The doctrine of privity originated in England with the landmark case of
Winterbottom v. Wright.5 In this case, the defendant had contracted with
the Postmaster-General to keep certain mailcoaches in a safe state of repair. Plaintiff was employed as a coachman by others who had contracted to drive the mailcoach along its route. Defendant negligently
permitted the coaches to fall into a state of disrepair and, as a result,
plaintiff was permanently injured when one of the coaches broke down.
The court, seeing defendant's duty as contractual, entered judgment for
defendant. 6 Plaintiff could not assert a cause of action in tort for injury
caused by the defendant's breach of contract, for he was not privy to the
7
contract.
In making its decision, the court expressed a fear that has been ofttimes repeated and still exists today.8 The court, through Lord Abinger,
4. Negligent misrepresentation is one classification of misrepresentation, along
with intentional misrepresentation. In the former the defendant has made erroneous
statements or representations which he actually believes to be true, while in the
latter the defendant has knowingly made a false representation. In 1889, the
House of Lords, in Derry v. Peek, 14 AC 337, 58 L.J. Ch. 864 (1889), associ-

ated intentional misrepresentation with an action for deceit and distinguished
negligent misrepresentation. It was held that plaintiff's action for deceit would not
lie, because only negligence was proved, and for an action of deceit there must be

proof "that a false representation has been made (1) knowingly or (2) without
belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false." Both in the
United States and eventually in England the remedy for negligent misrepresentation has become an action for negligence.
5. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
6. Id. at 116, 152 Eng. Rep. at 406.
7. Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.

8. The classic expression of this fear was in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven, and Co., 225 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931), where Mr. Justice

Cardozo said: "If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder,
the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries may,
expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate
time, to indeterminate class."
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C. B., said: "We ought not to permit a doubt to rest on this subject, for our
doing so might be the means of letting in upon us an infinity of actions."9
He further stated:
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue,
every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the
upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd
and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit would ensue. 10

Alderson, B., concurred by enunciating his belief that:
If we were to hold that the plaintiff could sue in such a case, there is no point at
which such actions would stop. The only safe rule is to confine the right to recover
to those who enter into the contract: if we go one step beyond that, there is no
reason why we should not go fifty."1

Although the decision held that no action could be maintained on the
contract, a general rule developed that a contracting party was not liable
12
to one with whom he was not in privity.
The rule, according to Dean Prosser, is the result of an erroneous interpretation of the dictum of Lord Abinger. 1 Whatever the reason for
the rule's beginning, it prevailed into the twentieth century.' 4 The legal
justifications for the rule varied, 15 but as the social and legal philosophy
of the times changed, various exceptions to the rule developed.' 6 Probably the most important exception, enunciated a decade after Winterbottom, held a seller liable to a third person for the sale of a product "inherently dangerous to life or health."' 7
In 1916, the definition of "inherently dangerous" was broadened in the
landmark case of Mac Pherson v. Buick Motor Company.' 8 Mac Pherson

held that a manufacturer was liable to third parties not in privity of con9. Supra note 5, at 404.
10. Supra note 5, at 405.
11. Supra note 5, at 405.
12. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 659 (3d ed. 1964).
13. Id. at 658.
14. Id. at 659.
15. Id. Prosser gives two reasons. In the first place it was believed that
the seller's misconduct was not the legal cause of the injury to the ultimate consumer, because the injury was not forseeable and there was an intervening sale by
the retailer-purchaser which "insulated" the negligence of the manufacturer. Secondly, it was believed that to hold manufacturers liable to a great number of
unidentified plaintiffs would be too great a burden.
16. Id. at 659-60. The first exception was if the seller knew that the product
was dangerous and failed to make a disclosure to the purchaser, he was liable to
third parties. The second was where the goods were furnished for use on his premises, because the user was an invitee.
17. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
18. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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tract where the product, if negligently constructed, is likely to be dangerous and it is foreseeable that the product will be used by persons other
than the purchaser. In so holding the New York court stated that:
If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning
of the consequences to be expected.

If to the element of danger there is added

knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and used
without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully. 19
The significance of Mac Pherson lies in the fact that it extended the manufacturer's common law duty of care to foreseeable users, regardless of
their privity to the initial contract. This duty arose if he could foresee that
his product would be come a "thing of danger" if defectively made. The
phrase "inherently dangerous" thus included products which, if negligently
made, would be dangerous to life and limb.
20
Because Mac Pherson has been accepted throughout the United States
as an exception to the general rule of nonliability in the absence of privity,
the strict rule, for all practical purposes, has been swallowed by this one
exception. In spite of this, there are a certain number of limited situations
in which courts have been reluctant to impose liability in the absence of
privity.
Such a situation involves abstracts of title. The leading case in this
area is Savings Bank v. Ward,2 1 decided by the United States Supreme
Court in 1879. In this case, defendant attorney had furnished a certificate of title to the vendee of a parcel of land. On the strength of the certificate, the vendee obtained a loan from plaintiff, Savings Bank. The certificate proved to be incorrect, for the vendor had previously conveyed the
land to another by a duly executed and recorded deed. Plaintiff contended that defendant attorney was liable to him notwithstanding the fact
that defendant had had no knowledge of the eventual use that was to be
made of the certificate, or to whom it was to be presented. Defendant,
on the other hand, contended that there must be privity of contract between
the parties for liability to arise. Agreeing with defendant, the Supreme
Court stated that the situation was one which demanded application of
the general rule:
The obligation of an attorney is to his client and not to a third party, and unless there
something in the circumstances of this case to take it out of the general rule it seems
clear that the proposition of the defendant must be sustained. 22
19. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
20. Supra note 12, at 661.
21.

100 U.S. 195 (1879).

22. Id. at 200.
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Although the court spoke of an attorney's liability, the primary issue was
the absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant. Subsequent cases
as Savings Bank, alinvolving abstracts of title have reached the same result
23
though no attorney-client relationship was involved.
For exmple, in Talpey v. Wright,24 plaintiff was the assignee of Topeka
Investment and Loan Company, who had loaned money to a vendee of
realty. Plaintiff requested an abstract of title, and Topeka furnished the
one provided by defendants for the vendee. When the abstract proved
faulty, plaintiff sought relief against defendant abstractors. In holding
that plaintiff had no cause of action against these defendants, the court
stressed the fact that defendants did not contract to furnish the abstracts
to plaintiff nor to any one for the use and benefit of plaintiff. Therefore,
lack of privity prevented the plaintiff from ever having a cause of action.
This can be summarized by the general rule stated in Thomas v. Guarantee
Title and Trust Company:25 that the liability of an abstractor for damages
does not sound in tort, but must be founded in contract, and so an abstractor can be held liable only by those who employed him.
The rules in these first abstractor cases did not change after the MacPherson exception deleted the requirement of privity from products cases.
In 1926, in Peterson v. Gales26 the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:

By the great, if not universal, authority, the liability of an abstractor for damages resulting from his mistakes is based on contract, and does not rest upon principles of
negligence. He therefore is not liable to persons who may be misled to their damage
by reason of his negligence, unless some privity of contract exist between them
... . He who claims damages by reason of the negligence of an abstractor must
trace his27right thereto to some contractual relations existing between him and the abstractor.

Also in 1926, Abstract & Title Guaranty Company v. Kigin28 held that

the nature and scope of the liability assumed by an abstractor is purely contractual and consequently must be measured by the nature and terms of
the employment. In so holding, the Alabama court cited Savings Bank,
and the court in Phoenix Title and Trust Company v. Continental Oil
Company29 followed suit. By 1940, the Florida case of Sickler v. Indi23. Abstract & Title Guaranty Co. v. Kigin, 21 Ala. App. 397, 108 So. 626
(1926); Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d
1065 (1934); Talpey v. Wright, 61 Ark. 275, 32 S.W. 1072 (1895); Brown v.
Simms, 22 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899).
24. Talpey v. Wright, supra note 23.
25. 81 Ohio St. 432, 91 N.E. 183 (1910).
26. 191 Wisc. 137, 210 N.W. 407 (1926).
27. Id. at 142-43, 210 N.W. at 409.
28. Abstract & Title Guarantee Co. v. Kigin, supra note 23.
29. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 23.
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ana River Abstract and Guarantee Company30 stated a general rule of

abstractor liability in almost the same terms as the Ohio Court had in
Thomas, a pre-MacPhersoncase. Thus it was clear that in one limited situation, at least, the requirement of privity had not been removed, and that
the trend started in Mac Pherson had not compltely erased the rule that had
developed out of Winterbottom.

In spite of the apparent clarity and definiteness of the general rule of
abstractors' liability, some courts recognized the possibility that in certain
instances an abstractor might be liable to a plaintiff not in privity of contract with him. 31 This view was supported even by some of the jurisdictions which had upheld the general requirement of privity in order for one
to recover from an abstractor of title. 32 Although the Supreme Court of
Arizona in Phoenix Title and Trust had denied recovery against defendant abstractor, it did recognize four exceptions to the privity requirement in such cases. The most important exception involved a situation
where the abstract was made for the benefit of a third person known to the
abstractor. Plaintiff urged that where the abstractor knows or has reason
to know that the abstract is to be used for the benefit of some indefinite and
unknown person, the exception should be applied. The court held that
line of reasoning to be erroneous, because in all the cases cited by plaintiff, the abstractor knew who the eventual plaintiff was. Quoting extensively from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares v. Touche, Niven, &

Co.,3 3 the court came to the conclusion that one not in privity with an abstractor would have a cause of action only if his identity was specifically
known to the abstractor. Specifically, the court concluded that:

So long as it is held that the liability of an abstractor is in contract and not in tort

I a third party, whose very existence is unknown to the abstractor at the time he
a4
issues his abstract may not sue for the negligence of the latter in preparing it.

The reasoning thus grants abstractors a protected position by analogy to
the Ultramares case, with a requirement of actual knowledge of the thirdparty beneficiary. In this way, contract theory is superimposed upon an
action sounding in tort.
Public accountants, like abstractors, have enjoyed a protected position
30.

142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940).

31. Brown v. Simms, supra note 23; Western Loan & Savings Co. v. Silver Bow,
31 Mont. 448, 78 P. 774 (1904); Economy Building & Loan Association v. West
Jersey Title & Guarantee Co., 64 N.J.L. 27, 44 A. 854 (1899); Dickel v. Nashville

Abstract Co., 89 Tenn. 431, 14 S.W. 896 (1890).
32. Pheonix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 23.
33. Supra note 8.
34. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Continental Oil Co., supra note 23, at 235,
29 P.2d at 1071.
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with regard to the privity requirement. The leading case is Ultramares. 5
Defendants, a firm of public accountants, were employed to prepare and
certify a balance sheet exhibiting the financial condition of Fred Stern
and Company. Defendants knew this and also that the certified balance
sheet would be exhibited to banks, creditors, stockholders, purchasers, and
sellers in the course of the financial dealings of Stern. Defendants supplied
thirty-two copies of the balance sheet, but the identity of the other persons
to whom these copies would be shown remained unknown. The balance
sheet incorrectly represented the corporation as solvent and plaintiff, a
factor, made several loans to Stern in reliance upon the balance sheet.
The plaintiff's cause of action for negligence is primary to the discussion
at hand, although the question of defendants' negligence was not seriously
in dispute in the court of appeals. The primary issue was whether defendants owed plaintiff a duty to prepare the balance sheet without negligence. Justice Cardozo concluded that previous decisions did not compel
the existence of such a duty and that the creation of a duty would be an unwarranted extension of the principles of previous decisions. This conclusion was reached because Justice Cardozo felt it would "so expand the
field of liability for negligent speech as to make it nearly, if not quite, coterminous with that of liability for fraud."3 6 Therefore, he was of the
opinion that such a revolutionary change was the province of the legislature, and not the judiciary.
In writing the opinion, Justice Cardozo also felt the need to distinguish
37
the decision he had rendered nine years earlier in Glanzer v. Shepard.
As in Ultramares, the issue there was one of duty, but Justice Cardozo
found that defendants' obligation was not one merely of contract.
In Glanzer, defendants were employed to make up a weight sheet representing the total weight of beans sold by the employer to plaintiffs, and
the weight sheet was prepared and delivered both to the employer and
to plaintiffs. Because the weight was incorrect as exhibited on the weight
sheets, plaintiffs brought suit, and recovered the amount of the overpayment from defendants.
But the weight sheet in Blanzer was "the end and aim of the transaction"3 8 and was prepared primarily for the benefit of (and was actually
delievered to) plaintiffs. In Ultramares, however, the work was done by
defendants primarily for their employer. The statements which were the
35. Supra note 8.
36. Supra note 8, at 185, 174 N.E. at 447.
37. Glanzer v. Shepard, 223 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
38. Supra note 8, at 182, 174 N.E. at 445.
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. only incidentally or collaterally for the use

of those to whom [the employer] and his associates might exhibit it there39
after."
The foregoing manner of distinguishing the two cases masks his real
reason for reaching a contrary result. In Glanzer, plaintiffs' identity was
known to defendants, while in Ultramares, plaintiff was unknown to defendants. It is this distinction that is material, because of Justice Cardozo's
fear of unlimited liability should public accountants be held liable to all
those not in privity who may be injured by negligent preparation of a
40
balance sheet.
In a 1963 case, American Casualty v. Memorial Hospital,41 the court
said that the cases following Glanzer have not extended the holding therein.
Rather, the majority of cases support the rule that there is no liability for
negligent misrepresentation to one not specifically known to defendant.
Reasonable anticipation that the representations will be communicated to
unknown parties to induce action is likewise insufficient to impose a duty
upon defendant to exercise care with respect to the unknown parties.
The courts' reluctance to impose liability for negligent misrepresentation in the absence of privity has been stubborn. A recent Illinois case,
Rozny v. Marnul,42 however, was an important first step toward the
imposition of such liability. In this case, one Nash purchased realty
from the S & S Builders and used the plat of an inaccurate survey, prepared
by defendant for S & S Builders, to obtain a loan commitment. Plaintiffs
purchased the house from Nash in January, 1956. In September of that
same year, plaintiffs extended their driveway and built a garage. Since
the survey was inaccurate, both the house and garage extended onto the
adjoining realty. Because the plat expressly provided an absolute guarantee of accuracy, plaintiffs sought to recover the cost of moving the house
and garage on the grounds of defendant's misrepresentation.
In giving judgment to plaintiffs, the court specifically declared that lack
of privity of contract was no longer a defense to a tort action in Illinois.
Liability, instead of being determined by the concepts of privity, would be
measured by the scope of the duty owed.
The court agreed with Justice Cardozo: In measuring the duty, the threat
of unlimited liability 43 should not be discounted. However, the court felt
39.

Supra note 8, at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.

40.

Supra note 8.

41. American Casualty v. Memorial Hospital, 223 F. Supp. 543 (E.D. Wis.
1963).
42.

Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).

43.

Supra note 8.
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that this fear could be minimized in the case at bar, due to the fact that
the liability was not potentially unlimited, because the class of persons who
might have foreseeably used the plat was limited to those who dealt with
the surveyed property as purchasers or lenders. Injury would ordinarily
occur only to the one then owning the property. Unfortunately, the court
did not delimit objective standards for measuring the duty owed; however,
it did list the several factors it considered relevant to its decision. The first
was the express, unrestricted, and wholly voluntary absolute guarantee for
accuracy stated in the plat; secondly, the fact that potential liability was
restricted to a comparatively small group and that ordinarily only one
member of that group would be injured; thirdly, the undesirability of requiring an innocent party to suffer the burden of defendant's professional
mistakes; fourth the defendant's knowledge that the plat would be used and
relied on by others; lastly, the probability that recovery would promote
caution among surveyors.
Rozny was very significant, because it specifically overruled two prior
Illinois decisions 44 which had denied relief because plaintiffs were not in
privity of contract with the defendants, whose representations they relied
on. In both cases, as in Rozny, the plaintiffs were unknown and unidentified to the defendants. Although the defendant in Rozny was found liable
to an unknown plaintiff, it was only the first step, because the spectre of
unlimited liability was not present, as it is in the usual cases involving abstractors and accountants. Nevertheless, it was important because there
was a possibility that the precedent cited in National Iron and Steel Company v. Hunt,4 5 National Savings Bank, Thomas, and Buckley v. Gray,46
may no longer be used as authority in Illinois. It will be interesting to see
whether Illinois will extend the holding by eliminating privity in cases of
negligent misrepresentation where there is a distinct possibility of unlimited liability.
California, unlike Illinois, has already taken the next step. To understand its significance, it is essential to trace a series of cases. Once the
seed of privity was planted in Winterbottom, it was nurtured and grew in
many jurisdictions, California among them. In 1895, the California Supreme Court decided Buckley. 4 7 This case involved an attorney who so
negligently drafted and directed the execution of a will that the plaintiff44.

National Iron and Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 425, 143 N.E. 833 (1924);

Albin v. Crop Improvement Association, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d 383, 174 N.E.2d
697 (1961).
45. National Iron and Steel Co. v. Hunt, supra note 44.
46. Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895).
47.

Id.
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beneficiary was precluded from taking under the instrument. Plaintiff
was denied recovery because the court ruled that his complaint failed to
state a cause of action. 48 The court noted in its opinion that:
It is a general doctrine, sustained by an overwhelming weight of authority, that an
attorney is liable for negligence in the conduct of his professional duties . ..to his
client alone-that is, to the one between whom and the attorney the contract of em49
ployment and service existed-and not to third parties.

Since there was no privity of contract between plaintiff-beneficiary and
defendant-attorney, the latter owed no duty to the beneficiary. As in
Winterbottom, the court expressed trepidation at the extent of the litigation
which might arise should a remedy be allowed: "There would be no
bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the ill effects of the negligence
of men may be followed down the chain of results to the final effect." 50
In effect, the court in Buckley gave credence to the doctrine set forth in
Winterbottom that privity of contract is necessary to the creation of a duty,
which in turn is a prerequisite liability. Buckley, however, would not
be the last time a California court would rely on the doctrine of privity to
deny a plaintiff a remedy.
As late as 1957, the California District Court of Appeals, in Mickel v.
Murphy,51 held that a notary public was not liable to a beneficiary of a will
which the notary prepared but failed to have properly executed. Under
the terms of the will, plaintiff was the sole beneficiary. By reason of the
fact that the will was not properly attested to, it was void, and plaintiff
was limited to an intestate share of one-half the estate. The court, relying
on Buckley, said that "[tihe defendant, if liable at all, was liable to Henry
Mickel, alone, for negligence. Plaintiff, not being a party to the transaction, cannot sue for the carelessness or negligence of defendant in failing
to prepare a valid will . .

*"52

As in Winterbottom and Buckley, one

who had been wronged was denied a remedy; but that situation was shortly
to change.
One year later, Biakanja v. Irving53 was appealed to the California Supreme Court. The facts were substantially identical to those in Mickel.
Here, however, the court stated the issue in terms of duty: "The principal
question is whether defendant was under a duty to exercise due care to
protect plaintiff from injury and was liable for damage caused plaintiff by
48.

Id. at 347, 42 P. at 902.

49. Id. at 345, 42 P. at 901.
50.

Id. at 344, 42 P. at 901.

51.
52.

Mickel v. Murphy, 147 Cal. App. 2d 718, 305 P.2d 993 (1957).
Id. at 721, 305 P.2d at 995.

53.

Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
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54
his negligence even though they were not in privity of contract.
The court overruled Buckley and Mickel on the ground that the rules
of nonliability in the absence of privity had been greatly relaxed. Having
set the stage for the relaxation of the privity requirement in California, the
court proceeded to establish guidelines to determine when a defendant
would be liable to a plaintiff not in privity:

The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to a
third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various
factors, among which are the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect
the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and
the policy of preventing future harm. 55

The court concluded that in light of the six factors set forth, plaintiff should
be allowed to recover in spite of the fact that he was not in privity of contract with defendant.
Biakanja unquestionably removed the requirement of privity as a prerequisite to the imposition of a duty under the facts in that case. But, it is
obvious that the defendant was aware that the instrument he was drawing
was intended to benefit only the plaintiff, and, therefore, the plaintiff was
known and identified to the defendant. The threat of unlimited liability
was not present.
Biakanja is the first step in California, just as Rozny was in Illinois. In
both cases the court emphasized that liability would depend upon the duty
owed rather than the concepts of privity. The primary difference is that,
in Biakanja, the court established six objective standards5 6 to determine
whether or not a duty exists. In one respect, Biakanja did not go as far as
Rozny. In neither case was the possibility of unlimited liability present,
but in Rozny, plaintiff was unknown to defendant, while in Biakanja, defendant was aware of the plaintiff's identity. This knowledge of the plaintiff's identity, important in determining liability as far as abstractors and
accountants were concerned, does not appear to be as important in these
cases because of the fact that the extent of liability is limited.
In 1961, the holding in Biakanja received two tests. The first, Lucas v.
Hamm,57 did no more than simply reaffirm Biakanja under a set of facts
substantially the same as those in Buckley. The second case extended
Biakanja to a point coterminous with the Rozny decision.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 18.
Id. at 651, 320 P.2d at 19.
Id.
57 Cal. 2d 821, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961).
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Stewart v. Cox58 involved a defendant-subcontractor who negligently
constructed a swimming pool. The pool cracked, and escaping water
damaged the house and yard of plaintiffs. The issue again was whether or
not defendant-subcontractor was liable for negligence to plaintiffs, with
whom he was not in privity of contract. The court answered the issue in
the affirmative, citing Biakanja, and concluded that liability for negligence may exist without privity of contract, the determination being a matter of policy involving the six factors set forth in Biakanja. 9 Stewart
extended Biakanja because plaintiffs were the unknown buyers of a home
for which defendant-subcontractor was building a swimming pool. It became clear that the holding in Biakanja was not to be restricted to apply
only to plaintiffs whose identity was known to defendant. Thus California
reached a point in 1961 that Illinois was not to reach until Rozny in 1969.
The court in Biakanja said that the question of whether a defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity of contract is a matter of policy involving the balancing of the six factors enunciated by the court.110
Stewart reaffirmed this policy concept with respect to plaintiffs whose identity is unknown to defendant. It appears that the court's premise is that in
redressing a wrong, there should not be a distinction made between a plaintiff known to defendant and one whose identity is not known, provided that
harm is foreseeable in each case. The court's refusal to make such a
distinction seems wise in light of the nature of the six factors set forth in
Biakanja01 For example, the first factor was the extent to which the
transaction was intended to benefit the plaintiff. If, on the one hand, the
transaction was intended for plaintiff's benefit, then there is no logical reason for distinguishing between a plaintiff whose identity was known to defendant and one whose identity was unknown. If, on the other hand, the
transaction is found not to be for plaintiff's benefit, then defendant would
not be liable, regardless of whether or not he was aware of plaintiff's
identity. This same line of reasoning can be applied to each of the six
factors logically to justify the extension of Biakanja that was made in
Stewart.
In 1962, Merrill v. Buck 12 was decided by the California Supreme
Court. Here defendant realtor showed a house to plaintiff, a prospective
lessee. After leasing the house, plaintiff was injured due to a latent defect of which he was unaware but of which defendant knew. Defendant
58.

55 Cal. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345 (1961).

59.
60.
61.

Supra note 53 at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.

62.

58 Cal. 2d 552, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304 (1962).
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realtor contended that, because he was not in privity with plaintiff, he was
under no duty to warn plaintiff of the latent defect.
In assessing defendant's contention, the court felt it necessary to consider the relationship between the parties. The court stressed defendant's
motivation in showing the home to plaintiff: "These defendants were not
motivated by altruism but by the hope of business profit."'6 3 The court
proceeded to discuss the reason defendant realtors were under a duty to
exercise care. Sounding very much like it did in Biakanja, the court said:
"Privity of contract is not necessary to establish the existence of a duty to
exercise ordinary care not to injure another, but such duty may arise out of
a voluntarily assumed relationship if public policy dictates the existence of
such a duty."'6 4 When does public policy dictate that such a duty exits?
The court answered that the six factors enunciated in Biakanja65 are the
test. Here the transaction was intended to affect plaintiff by creating the
relationship of landlord and tenant. 66 The fact that the jury rendered a
verdict against defendant established that the harm to plaintiff was foreseeable,6 7 the certainty that plaintiff suffered injury, 8 and the closeness of the
connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury.69 Also,
moral blame attached to defendant's conduct 70 by reason of defendant's
failure to warn plaintiff of the hazard to which he would be exposed. Liability imposed on defendant would serve the policy of preventing future
7
harm. 1
In 1962, M. Miller Company v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary District7 2 was decided by California's First District Court of Appeal. It
involved a plaintiff who contracted with the sanitary district to construct a
portion of a sewer. The district also employed defendants to conduct soil
tests in the area proposed for construction. Defendants performed the
tests negligently, with the result that their report failed to disclose unstable
material. Plaintiff had made its bid in reliance on defendants' soil report
and was injured when its costs were much greater due to the presence of
the unstable material. In reversing a summary judgment for defendants,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 558, 375 P.2d at 310.
Id.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.
Supra note 53.
198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961).
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the appellate court rejected defendants' contention that there was no liability
to plaintiff because they were not in privity of contract. 73 The court
stressed that since the transaction between defendants and the sanitary
district was intended to affect plaintiff-as one of the bidders for whom
the soil test was made-the harm to plaintiff was foreseeable, and de74
fendants' negligence was the direct cause of plaintiff's injury.
Once again a California court had reaffirmed that a defendant may owe
a duty to a plaintiff not in privity of contract where public policy so dictates, regardless of whether plaintiff's identity is known or unknown to
defendant. The existence of the duty would depend, not on defendant's
knowledge of plaintiffs identity, but on the six factors set forth in Biakanja.75 Thus the court had made the same extension of Biakanja as
was made in Stewart. It is possible, however, that the court made the
extension because, as in both Stewart and Miller, the injury would normally occur only once, and that liability would definitely be limited.
In the event any doubt existed as to the extension, the California Supreme Court dispelled it in 1968 when it decided Connor v. Great Western
Savings and Loan Association.76 In holding the defendant Savings and
Loan Association, which financed a housing development, liable to the unknown purchasers of homes, the court quoted from Merrill to the effect
that the fact that defendant was not in privity of contract with plaintiff did
not absolve it of liability for its own negligence. The court then quoted
the standards established in Biakanja 77 to determine the existence of a
duty, and concluded that the duty existed, notwithstanding the fact that
plaintiffs were unknown to defendant. The extent of liability was potentially much greater in Connor than in Stewart and Miller, and still the court
made the extension of liability to an unknown and unidentified plaintiff.
To this extent California has gone further than Illinois78 or any previous
case in California.
In 1969, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, was faced
with a more extreme situation than the previous cases in which a duty had
been found owing from defendant to plaintiff. In Hanberry,7 9 the court
was faced with a plaintiff whose identity was not only unknown to defendant, but belonged to a virtually limitless class, the public at large.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 311, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
Id. at 308, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
Supra note 53.
69 Cal. 2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968).
Supra note 53.
Supra note 42.
Supra note 1.
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The court first stated the issue:
The basic question presented in this appeal is whether one who endorses a product

for his own economic gain, and for the purpose of encouraging and inducing the public to buy it, may be liable to a purchaser who, relying on the endorsement, buys the

product and is injured because it is defective and not as represented in the endorsement.80

The court then proceeded to follow the line of cases which preceded the
one at bar. Citing Merrill, the court stated that privity of contract was not
necessary to establish a duty; rather, a duty might arise out of a voluntarily assumed relationship, such as the business relationship in the case at
bar. After quoting the Biakanja standards, 81 the court concluded that
such a duty existed: "We believe appellant has set forth sufficient facts
to meet the foregoing test and to establish . . . [that] respondent Hearst

had a duty to exercise ordinary care in issuing its seal and its certification
it had satisfied itself the shoes were 'good ones.' ",82 The court, in effect,
stated the law as established in previous cases, and came to a legal conclusion without any reasoning whatsoever. It is unfortunate the court was so
remiss in not indicating how the Biakanja standards 83 applied to create the
duty. Had this been a case with facts identical, or substantially similar to
a previous case, this laxity might have passed unnoticed; however, here the
judgment was in favor of a very remote plaintiff.
In spite of the paucity of reasoning, it can be inferred what must have
been the court's reasoning from its conclusion. Even though plaintiff was
neither identified to the defendant nor a member of a limited, identifiable
class, the court still concluded that a duty existed. Therefore, the court
must have felt that, to an extent sufficient to impose a duty of care upon defendant, 1. The transaction was intended to affect plaintiff; 2. the harm to
plaintiff was foreseeable in the event the shoes were negligently constructed; 3. plaintiff suffered injury; 4. the connection between defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered was sufficiently proximate; 5. moral blame
attached to defendant's conduct; and 6. the imposition of liability would
further the public policy of preventing future harm.
Earlier it was said that Hanberry was the culmination of a series of cases
which, in California, have eliminated the requirement of privity of contract to recover in a tort action against one who endorses another's product.
How is this so? The law cited does not differ materially from the previ80.

Supra note 1, at 521.

81.
82.
83.

Supra note 53.
Supra note 1, at 523.
Supra note 53.
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ous California cases. s4 However, here the representations were made in
magazines to the public at large. The remoteness of the plaintiff in Hanberry is conspicuously obvious when compared to the relationships of the
plaintiffs to the defendants in the previous cases. The court is applying the
same law to a much broader situation, thereby extending liability in the absence of privity to such an extent that it is virtually eliminated. In effect,
anyone could recover from defendant upon a showing of reliance upon defendant's misrepresentations.
Although the factual situation in Hanberry differs from the cases involving abstractors, accountants, and attorneys, the situations are analogous
in that a defendant has made representations which have resulted in injury 5 to a plaintiff who, though he is not in privity with defendant, has relied upon the representations to his detriment. It would seem that a plaintiff in any of the above situations could recover in California. The duty
would be found from Biakanja, and the fear of extended liability to unknown plaintiffs would no longer be a consideration since Hanberry.
87
This fear, first expressed in Winterbottom,s6 and so often separated,
was not even a factor in the court's decision in Hanberry. The omission
from consideration of this fear is one of the primary reasons that this case
virtually eliminates privity. Because this fear is so deeply rooted in legal
thinking, the court was remiss in dismissing it without so much as a mention of it. Was it because the court could find no argument to counter its
effect? I think not. There are several countervailing arguments of considerable weight. In the first place, defendant has committed a wrong and
plaintiff has suffered. A duty has been imposed on defendant and he has
violated it. It is not in the nature of the law to withhold a remedy where
such a duty has been imposed. Should the law now withhold the remedy
because defendants liability may be great? Again the answer must be in
the negative, especially in light of the other arguments available to counterbalance the fear of such liability.
84.

Biakanja v. Irving, supra note 53; Merrill v. Buck, supra note 62; M. Miller

Co. v. Central Costa Sanitary District, supra note 72; Connor v. Great Western,
supra note 76.
85. In Hanberry the plaintiff suffered personal injuries while the plaintiffs in
abstractor and accountant cases normally suffer economic injury. The courts have
been more reluctant to redress the latter type injury, although logically there is no
basis for such reluctance. Personal injuries are compensated by money damages
just as are economic injuries.

86.

Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 111-12, 152 Eng. Rep. 404-05

(Ex. 1842).

87. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven, and Co., 225 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441
(1931).
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Secondly, defendant is engaging in a business for profit. It is much
more able than the "average" individual plaintiff to bear the costly results
of its own breach of duty. Should it not do so? In addition, defendant has other means at its disposal. It is able, by the rates it charges,
to spread the risk of injury among a great many of its clients, virtually
eliminating the burden on a single individual. Furthermore, through the
use of liability insurance, defendant could avoid the dangers of extended
liability.
It would not be for the courts to require insurance or that an amount be
set aside from defendant's fees. Such requirements would be in the
province of the legislature. These methods, however, suggest that the fear
of unlimited liability should not be .used to deny a plaintiff relief. By imposing liability in such cases, the courts will be furthering the policy of preventing future harm. s s Finally, in the event liability threatens to become
too extreme, the courts could eliminate the threat by a proximate cause
argument. This essentially is a question of whether the law, under current public policy concepts, will expand liability to the defendant's conduct for the injury which has resulted to plaintiff. This can be stated in
terms of whether the duty imposed on defendant includes responsibility for
such injury. If defendant's negligent conduct was not the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injury, no liability would attach.
What can the practical effects of a decision like Hanberry be? The
answers to a question like this must be speculative because they will necessarily involve prediction of the future judicial trends that will be taken by
the court. Nevertheless, speculation in this area might be quite interesting.
Today, independent testing agencies play a much more expanded role in
our society than ever before.8 9 Manufacturers throughout the United States
rely on such agencies as a means of advertising and selling their products.
The American consumer, more and more, has come to rely upon these
certifications of quality from agencies having no financial interest in the
success of the products they test.
Because of the great reliance placed on the certifications of these agencies by the public at large and because of the possibility of injury should
the tests be performed negligently, these independent testing agencies
should owe a duty to consumers. Unfortunately, precedent has generally
88. Supra note 53.
89. A book has been published giving a descriptive inventory of the work of
about 350 American organizations involved in standardization activities. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL

TIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1960).
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See 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 77 n.4.
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not supported this view.90 But the outlook has become more optimistic
for several reasons. In the first place, the decisions holding that testing
agencies are not liable to consumers in the absence of privity have not been
unanimous.

For example, in Du Rite Laundry, Inc. v. Washington Elec.

Co.,91 the New York Appellate Court held that if plaintiff recovered from
defendant for defective machinery, the testing company would be liable
to defendant. Although it appears that this case has not been used as
precedent by another court, it does indicate that, in New York, an independent testing agency may be liable to third parties not in privity of contract. Secondly, the leading case involving the liability of these testing
agencies is National Iron.a2 As previously discussed, this case has just
recently been overruled by Rozny. Lastly, in Hanberry, California already has held one of these independent testing agencies liable to a plaintiff not in privity of contract. Because of the foregoing reasons, it seems
likely that other courts may start to review their decisions in this area. If
testing agencies are going to continue to allow their tests and certifications
to be used in advertising in exchange for financial remuneration, they
should be held accountable for a negligent performance of their undertaking.
lack J. Leon

90. National Iron and Steel Co. v. Hunt, supra note 44.
Libingston, 12 Mo. App. 267 (1882).
91. 263 App. Div. 596, 33 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1942).
92. National Iron and Steel Co. v. Hunt, supra note 44.
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